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by Sergei Soares, Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA); and
Eduardo Zepeda, International Poverty Centre
Targeting performance Over the last decade or so, Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT)
programmes have proliferated in Latin America and beyond.
CCTs are designed to reduce poverty, both in the short and the
long term. These programmes usually provide a cash transfer to
poor families, conditioned on children’s school attendance and
regular medical checks-ups of both children and pregnant women.
CCTs are seen by many national governments and multilateral
agencies as a cost-effective instrument to reduce poverty and
provide the poor with opportunities. Overall, the sum of all transfers
represents a very small share of national budgets and, obviously,
even smaller fractions of national incomes. Still, CCTs can have a
significant impact on poverty and inequality.
There is an extensive list of studies showing that CCTs reduce
poverty, improve education and health outcomes, and alleviate
various other sufferings of the poor, such as child labour and child
mortality. There is also a heated debate on whether cash transfers
should be conditional or not. However, not much has been
discussed about their impact on the unacceptably high income
inequality that has tormented Latin America for centuries. A recent
paper examines the impact of such programmes on inequality
in the three countries currently applying the best-known CCTs,
i.e., Brazil’s Bolsa Família, Chile’s Chile Solidario, and Mexico’s
Oportunidades. These three countries also happen to have solid
national statistical systems and household surveys covering
periods of reference before and after implementation of their
respective CCT programme, which allows good impact evaluation.
These programmes differ from one another in several ways. Bolsa
Família and Oportunidades are both large programmes, covering
respectively 11 and 5 million beneficiary households in 2004, but
they diverge in the way targeting takes place. While Bolsa Família
is a highly decentralised programme where targeting is the
responsibility of municipal governments, Oportunidades undertakes
massive surveys of poor areas to choose the target population
through a much more centralised mechanism. By contrast, Chile
Solidario is a small programme covering only about 225,000
households. It targets the extremely poor through a national
system that registers beneficiaries on the basis of intense
monitoring of families conducted by social workers.
The impact of CCTs on inequality can be gauged from the most
widespread measure of income distribution, namely, the Gini
coefficient. Total household income derives from several sources:
labour, pensions, social security and CCT transfers, among others.
Changes in the Gini coefficient can be broken down into changes
in each income component. How much any given component
actually contributes to the total change in inequality can in turn
be indicated by the change in inequality of that component (“the
concentration coefficient”) and by the change in the component’s
share of total income.
All three CCTs examined show outstanding targeting results. Their
concentration coefficients are close to –0.5, i.e. nearer the perfect
pro-poor coefficient of -1 and far from the least pro-poor, +1. This
can also be seen in the diagram, which shows concentration curves
for the CCT component of total income in each country. For
reference, the graph also shows the 45º degree line that assigns
the same income to everyone in the population. Since all three
concentration curves pass far above that line, the implication is that
CCTs are transferring income to the poorest, thus reducing inequality.
Remarkably, despite differences in the targeting mechanism, the
effectiveness in reaching the poor is similarly high in the three
programmes considered.
The reduction in inequality produced by Chile Solidario had only
a small impact, changing a meagre 0.1 point in the Gini coefficient.
Inequality in Mexico and Brazil, on the other hand, fell by 2.7 points.
The key to understanding these results can be found in the share of
total income that such transfers represent. The well-targeted income
transfers of Oportunidades and Bolsa Família are sufficiently large to
produce a significant reduction in inequality, even though they are
small (close to 0.5%) in relation to total national household income
in Brazil and Mexico. By contrast, the transfers of Chile Solidario are so
small (less than 0.01% of total household income) that even with very
good targeting they cannot make a dent in inequality.
Much remains to be discussed about CCTs, not least whether transfers
should be targeted or universal and whether they should be conditional
or unconditional. This brief analysis of three conditional cash transfer
programmes and inequality suggests two particular issues for further
discussion: (i) the choice among alternative ways to design an effective
targeting mechanism; and ii) the optimal scale and income-targeting
threshold that can ensure a meaningful impact on inequality.
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